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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No.  05-4745
                              




                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 99-cr-00363-10)
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 13, 2007
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed July 26, 2007)
                              
OPINION 
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge.
This is the second time Angelo Lutz has appealed his sentence after having been
convicted, inter alia, on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (“RICO”)
     1The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).
2
charges relating to his involvement in organized crime activities.  We will not get into the
extensive procedural and factual background of this case here, as we write only for the
parties and, in any event, it is recounted in an earlier decision in this matter.  See United
States v. Merlino, 349 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2003).
Stated broadly, in his first appeal Lutz challenged the District Court’s calculation
of the amount of monetary loss to victims caused by the conspiracy that was properly
attributable to him.  Initially, the District Court had attributed to Lutz the entire loss
charged to the conspiracy ($300,500), going back to its inception in 1992.  Pursuant to the
Sentencing Guidelines, this resulted in a three-level enhancement to Lutz’s base offense
level.  On appeal, we vacated the District Court’s decision in that regard, holding that the
record did not support Lutz’s involvement in the conspiracy at such an early stage.  See
id. at 157–59.  On remand, the District Court determined that the record supported a
conclusion that Lutz was involved in the conspiracy beginning in December of 1996, and
attributed to him the loss, amounting to $159,500, associated with both his direct
involvement and that associated with other members of the conspiracy with whom he
most closely worked.  This amount called for a two-level upward adjustment to the
Guidelines base-offense level.  Lutz again appeals; this time we affirm.1
In United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1992), we explained the scope
of co-conspirator liability as it relates to the Guidelines calculation of loss amounts
3attributable to a particular defendant.  Though the scope of accomplice liability as it
relates to criminal convictions can be quite broad, see United States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d
893, 897 (3d Cir. 1994), the Guidelines require a more nuanced approach.  For Guidelines
purposes, a defendant is liable for those acts of co-conspirators taken “‘in furtherance of
the . . . jointly-undertaken . . . activity,’ were ‘within the scope of the defendant’s
agreement,’ and were ‘reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity the
defendant agreed to undertake.’”  Collado, 975 F.2d at 995 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3). 
Put another way, the Guidelines are concerned with the scope of a defendant’s agreed-
upon involvement in a given conspiracy, not the scope of the conspiracy itself.
In this case the Government argued—and the District Court found—that Lutz was
responsible for the losses that he personally caused as well as those undertaken by others
in the conspiracy with whom he regularly associated and closely worked.  Taking into
account our earlier decision that Lutz was not responsible for losses as early as 1992, the
Court began its loss calculation with the first racketeering act charged against Lutz that
was found “proven” by the jury (in December of 1996).  Lutz, on the other hand, asserted
that only those extortions in which he was personally involved should figure into his
Guidelines loss calculation.  We agree with the District Court.
As an initial matter, Collado instructs that the loss amount attributable to Lutz is
not necessarily limited only to his own acts.  What matters is what losses were reasonably
foreseeable as a result of Lutz’s specific agreement with his co-conspirators, even if he
did not personally cause those losses.  The conspiracy that Lutz agreed to join—and it is
4evident from the jury verdict that he did so agree—was the wide-ranging, systematic
extortion of bookmakers in the Philadelphia area.  
The facts here are analogous to those in United States v. Duliga, 204 F.3d 97 (3d
Cir. 2000), in which the defendant joined a fraudulent telemarketing scam.  In holding
him responsible for the fraud loss caused by the other co-conspirators, we noted that the
defendant knew of the fraudulent nature of the activity, that he employed the same
techniques as his co-conspirators, and that he worked in close proximity with them such
that he certainly knew the scope of their scamming activities.  Id. at 101.  Similarly here. 
Regardless whether Lutz personally participated in each individual act of extortion, when
he joined the organized crime conspiracy he certainly knew of its illegal purpose at the
outset.  In addition, conspiracy members all employed the same techniques, often
following up on unfinished “business” begun by another.  And most significantly from
the standpoint of loss calculation, each co-conspirator helped to arrange the lucrative
“Christmas shakes,” in which local bookmakers were forced to pay substantial sums
under threat of violence each year at Christmastime.  This aspect of the conspiracy alone
accounted for $101,500 of the District Court’s loss calculation, which would be sufficient
by itself to sustain the two-level Guidelines enhancement that was applied.
In this context, we affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the District Court.
